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ABSTRACT
Vetta (2002) shows that for a valid non-cooperative utility system, if the social
utility function is submodular, then any Nash equilibrium achieves at least 1/2 of the
optimal social utility, subject to a function-dependent additive term. Moreover, if the
social utility function is nondecreasing and submodular, then any Nash equilibrium
achieves at least 1/(1 + c) of the optimal social utility, where c is the curvature of
the social utility function. In this paper, we consider variations of the utility system
considered by Vetta, in which users are grouped together. Our aim is to establish
how grouping and cooperation among users affect performance bounds. We consider
two types of grouping. The first type is from Chen, Gong, Yang, & Zhang (2014),
where each user belongs to a group of users having social ties with it. For this type of
utility system, each user’s strategy maximizes its social group utility function, giving
rise to the notion of social-aware Nash equilibrium. We prove that this social utility
system yields to the bounding results of Vetta for non-cooperative system, thus
establishing provable performance guarantees for the social-aware Nash equilibria.
For the second type of grouping we consider, the set of users is partitioned into l
disjoint groups, where the users within a group cooperate to maximize their group
utility function, giving rise to the notion of group Nash equilibrium. In this case, each
group can be viewed as a new user with vector-valued actions, and a 1/2 bound for
the performance of group Nash equilibria follows from the result of Vetta. But as
we show tighter bounds involving curvature can be established. By defining the
group curvature cki associated with group i with ki users, we show that if the social
utility function is nondecreasing and submodular, then any group Nash equilibrium
achieves at least 1/(1 + max1≤i≤l cki) of the optimal social utility, which is tighter
than that for the case without grouping. As a special case, if each user has the
same action space, then we have that any group Nash equilibrium achieves at least
1/(1+ ck∗) of the optimal social utility, where k
∗ is the least number of users among
the l groups. Finally, we present an example of a utility system for database assisted
spectrum access to illustrate our results.
KEYWORDS
Group Nash equilibrium; social-aware Nash equilibrium; submodularity; utility
system
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1. Introduction
A variety of interesting practical problems can be posed as utility maximiza-
tion problems: these include facility location (e.g., Ahmed & Atamt (2011)),
traffic routing and congestion management (e.g., Arslan, Marden, & Shamma
(2007) and He, Bresler, Chiang, & Rexford (2007)), sensor selection (e.g.,
Rowaihy, Eswaran, Johnson, Verma, Bar-noy, Brown, & Porta (2007) and
Liu, Chong, & Scharf (2014)), and network resource allocation (e.g.,
La & Anantharam (2002), Palomar & Chiang (2007), Chen, Gong, Yang, & Zhang
(2014), and Wu, Xu, Chen, & Lu (2012)). In a utility maximization problem, a set of
users make decisions according to their own set of feasible strategies, resulting in an
overall social utility value, such as profit, coverage, achieved data rate, and quality of
service. The goal is to maximize the social utility function. Often, the users do not
cooperate in selecting their strategies.
In general, it is impractical to find the globally optimal sequence (finite, ordered
collection) of strategies maximizing the social utility function. Typically, it is more
useful to consider scenarios where individual users or groups of users separately max-
imize their own private objective functions, and then ask how this compares with the
globally optimal case. The usual framework for studying such scenarios is game the-
ory together with its celebrated notion of Nash equilibria. A Nash equilibrium is a
sequence of strategies (deterministic or randomized) for which no user can improve its
own private utility by changing its strategy unilaterally. Nash (1951) proves that any
finite and non-cooperative game has at least one Nash equilibrium.
The question of how the Nash solution compares with the globally optimal solu-
tion is one of the most challenging problems in game theory and has received sig-
nificant attention in the literature (see the survey by Papadimitriou (2001)). For
example, results have been reported by Koutsoupias & Papadimitriou (2009) and
Roughgarden & Tardos (2002) in the context of traffic routing and congestion man-
agement, which aims to minimize the total latency. For a general utility maximization
problem, Vetta (2002) develops lower bounds on the worst-case social utility value
in non-cooperative games. Specifically, he proves that for a submodular social utility
function in a valid utility system, any Nash equilibrium achieves at least 1/2 of the
optimal social utility value, subject to a function-dependent additive term. He also
shows that for a nondecreasing and submodular social utility function in a valid util-
ity system, any Nash equilibrium can achieve at least 1/(1 + c) of the optimal social
utility function value, where 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 is the curvature of the social utility function.
With the advent of social networks, there is increasing interest in understand-
ing the role of cooperation and social ties in games (see, e.g., the recent paper by
Allen, Lippne, Chen, Fotouhi, Momeni, Yau, Nowa (2017)). In our paper, we are in-
terested in exploring bounds for Nash equilibria when there is some notion of “group-
ing” among users. Along these lines, we consider two notions of grouping that yield
to provable performance bounds. The first type of grouping we consider is the re-
cent framework of Chen, Gong, Yang, & Zhang (2014), where associated with each
user is a private objective function and a fixed group of users having some social
ties with it. Each user’s strategy maximizes an objective function called the social
group utility, which is the sum of its private objective function and a linear combi-
nation of the private objective functions of users in its group. Within this setting,
Chen, Gong, Yang, & Zhang (2014) define what they call a social-aware Nash equilib-
rium, where no user can improve its social group utility by unilaterally changing its
strategy. We will show that this framework yields to the bounding results of Vetta
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(2002) for noncooperative games, thus establishing provable performance guarantees
for the framework of Chen, Gong, Yang, & Zhang (2014).
In the second type of grouping we consider, the set of users is partitioned into
disjoint groups. Associated with each group is a group utility function. Users within
a group cooperate in the sense that their strategy is to (jointly) maximize the group
utility function, giving rise to a natural definition of group Nash equilibrium. Although
we can view each group as a new user with vector-valued actions so that a similar 1/2
bound to the result of Vetta (2002) holds, we would like to investigate the performance
bound for the group Nash equilibrium in terms of curvature and compare it with the
case where there is no grouping. We define a measure of group curvature and derive an
associated lower bound involving this curvature. We prove that this bound is tighter
than that for the case without grouping among users, accounting for the cooperation
within the groups. We also prove that, under the condition that each user has the
same action space, the higher the degree of cooperation, the tighter the lower bound.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our
notation and some definitions that will be used throughout the paper. In Section 3,
we review the bounding results of Vetta (2002). In Section 4, we first describe the
framework of Chen, Gong, Yang, & Zhang (2014) and show that a social-aware utility
system yields to the bounding results of Vetta for non-cooperative system, thus estab-
lishing provable performance guarantees for the social-aware Nash equilibrium. Next,
we describe our second type of grouping involving l disjoint groups with in-group coop-
eration. In this case, each group can be viewed as a new user with vector-valued actions,
and a 1/2 bound for the performance of group Nash equilibrium follows from the result
of Vetta (2002). We then define the group curvature cki associated with group i with ki
users, and we show that if the social utility function is nondecreasing and submodular,
then any group Nash equilibrium achieves at least 1/(1 +max1≤i≤l cki) of the optimal
social utility, which is tighter than that for the case without grouping. Especially, if
each user has the same action space, then we have that any group Nash equilibrium
achieves at least 1/(1+ck∗) of the optimal social utility, where k
∗ is the least number of
users among all the groups. In Section 5, we present an example of a utility system for
database assisted spectrum access, adopted from Chen, Gong, Yang, & Zhang (2014).
We show that the utility system for this example is valid and the social utility function
is submodular, illustrating an application of our results.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we first introduce notation and a number of definitions used throughout
the paper.
2.1. Actions
Suppose we have a set N = {1, 2, . . . , N} of N users and ground sets V1, V2, . . . , VN ,
where each element in Vi denotes an act that user i can take. We call a set of acts
an action, and if an action xi ⊆ Vi is available to user i we call it a feasible action.
We denote by Xi the set of all feasible actions for user i, i.e., Xi = {xi ⊆ Vi : xi is a
feasible action}, with ni = |Xi| the cardinality of Xi.
Let X =
∏N
i=1 Xi andX = (xi1 , . . . , xik), where xj ∈ Xj, with i1 ≤ j ≤ ik. We call X
an action sequence of length k in X . This sequence includes the actions taken by users
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i1, . . . , ik in order. Given an action sequence X, suppose Y is formed by removing some
of the elements of X without changing the order of the remaining elements. Then, we
call the derived action sequence Y a subsequence of X and denote this relation by
Y ⊆ X. This follows the definition of a subsequence in Jawaid & Smith (2015).
Consider an action sequence X = (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ X . Then, X−i =
(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN ) is the subsequence of X that includes actions taken
by all users except user i. We use (X−i, x
′
i) to denote the action sequence
(x1, . . . , xi−1, x
′
i, xi+1, . . . , xN ) that results from X when user i changes its action from
xi to x
′
i.
Given action sequences Y = (yi1 , . . . , yik) and Z = (zj1 , . . . , zjl), we define Y ⊕Z =
(yi1 , . . . , yik , zj1 , . . . , zjl) as the concatenation of Y and Z when ip 6= jq for 1 ≤ p ≤ k
and 1 ≤ q ≤ l (following the notation in Zhang, Chong, Pezeshki, & Moran (2016)).
2.2. Strategies
Let si = (s
1
i , . . . , s
ni
i ), where s
j
i ≥ 0 is the probability with which user i takes action
j and
∑ni
j=1 s
j
i = 1. Following the terminology of Vetta (2002), we call si a strategy
taken by user i. When sji = 1 and s
l
i = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ ni and l 6= j, we say that user i
takes a pure strategy. Otherwise, we say that user i takes a mixed strategy.
Let Si = {si ∈ R
ni
i :
∑ni
j=1 s
j
i = 1, s
j
i ≥ 0} be the strategy space for user i and
S =
∏N
i=1 Si. Similar to the definition of an action sequence, we call S = (si1 , . . . , sik),
with sj ∈ Sj and i1 ≤ j ≤ ik, a strategy sequence of length k in S. Then a subsequence
T of S is a sequence derived from S by deleting some elements without changing the
order of the remaining elements. We define Si = (s1, . . . , si), for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , as a
sequence of strategies taken by users 1, . . . , i.
Given a strategy sequence S = (s1, . . . , sN ) ∈ S, the sequence S−i =
(s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sN ) is the subsequence of S that contains strategies taken by
all users except user i, and (S−i, s
′
i) = (s1, . . . , si−1, s
′
i, si+1, . . . , sN ) is the strategy
sequence that results from S when user i changes its strategy from si to s
′
i.
Given strategy sequences T = (ti1 , . . . , tik) and W = (wj1 , . . . , wjl), we write T ⊕
W = (ti1 , . . . , tik , wj1 , . . . , wjl) for the concatenation of T and W when ip 6= jq for
1 ≤ p ≤ k and 1 ≤ q ≤ l.
2.3. Utility Functions
We define the social utility function as a mapping γ from sequences in X to real
numbers, and the private utility function for user i (1 ≤ i ≤ N) as a mapping αi from
sequences in X to real numbers. Correspondingly, we define γ¯ and α¯i as mappings,
from sequences in S to real numbers, that correspond to the expectations of γ and αi,
respectively. We call γ¯ the expected social utility function and α¯i the expected private
utility function for user i. We also define γZ(Y ) = γ(Y ⊕ Z) − γ(Y ) for any Y,Z in
X such that Y ⊕ Z is well defined, and γ¯W (T ) = γ¯(T ⊕W )− γ¯(T ) for any T,W in S
such that T ⊕W is defined.
We denote by Ω the optimal sequence of strategies in maximizing an expected
utility function γ¯, and assume that Ω = (σ1, . . . , σN ) is composed of pure strategies
σi ∈ Si, i = 1, . . . , N . For convenience, we also use σi to denote the optimal action
that user i takes. Then, we have that the optimal value of γ¯, denoted by OPT, is
OPT = γ¯(Ω) = γ(Ω).
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2.4. Curvature, Monotoneity, and Submodularity
Given a strategy sequence Si = (s1, . . . , si) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , we use the notation
Ω ∪ Si to represent the sequence in which user j (1 ≤ j ≤ i) implements the actions
σj ∪ x
1
j , . . . , σj ∪ x
nj
j with probabilities s
1
j , . . . , s
nj
j , and user j (j > i) plays the action
σj , so γ¯(Ω ∪ Si) is well defined. Then the curvature c of the expected social utility
function γ¯ is defined as
c = max
i:γ¯si (∅)6=0
{
1−
γ¯si(Ω ∪ S−i)
γ¯si(∅)
}
.
The social utility function γ is called nondecreasing if for all subsequences Y of
a sequence X in X , i.e., Y ⊆ X in X , f(Y ) ≤ f(X). It is called submodular if for
all Y ⊆ X and Z in X such that X ⊕ Z is defined, we have γZ(Y ) ≥ γZ(X). Our
terminology here is consistent with that of Jawaid & Smith (2015). Because γ¯ is the
expected value of γ, we have that if γ is nondecreasing and submodular, then γ¯ is
also nondecreasing and submodular, respectively. So in the following sections, when
we say that γ is nondecreasing and submodular, it implies that γ¯ is nondecreasing and
submodular, respectively.
3. Performance Bounds for Nash Equilibria
In this section, we first review the definitions of a Nash equilibrium and a valid utility
system from Vetta (2002). We then review the bounds derived in Vetta (2002) for the
performance of any Nash equilibrium.
Definition 3.1. A strategy sequence S ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium if no user has an
incentive to unilaterally change its strategy, i.e., for any user i,
α¯i(S) ≥ α¯i((S−i, s
′
i)), ∀s
′
i ∈ Si. (1)
Assumption 1. Vetta (2002) The private utility of user i (1 ≤ i ≤ N) is at least
as large as the loss in the social utility resulting from user i dropping out of the
game. That is, the system (γ¯, {α¯i}
N
i=1) has the property that for any strategy sequence
S = (s1, . . . , sN ) ∈ S,
α¯i(S) ≥ γ¯si(S−i), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ N. (2)
Assumption 2. Vetta (2002) The sum of the private utilities of the system is not
larger than the social utility, i.e., for any strategy sequence S = (s1, . . . , sN ) ∈ S,
N∑
i=1
α¯i(S) ≤ γ¯(S). (3)
A utility system (γ, {αi}
N
i=1) satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2 is called a valid sys-
tem. Given X ∈ X , if for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N , the inequalities αi(X) ≥ γxi(X−i) and∑N
i=1 αi(X) ≤ γ(X) hold, then the inequalities (2) and (3) hold.
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Theorem 3.2. Vetta (2002) For a valid utility system (γ, {αi}
N
i=1), if the social utility
function γ is submodular, then for any Nash equilibrium S ∈ S we have
γ¯(S) ≥
1
2
(
γ¯(Ω) +
N∑
i=1
γ¯si(S−i ∪ Ω)
)
. (4)
If γ is non-decreasing, then γ¯si(S−i ∪ Ω) ≥ 0 and the above inequality shows that
any Nash equilibrium achieves at least 1/2 of the optimal social utility function value.
Theorem 3.3. Vetta (2002) For a valid utility system (γ, {αi}
N
i=1), if the social utility
function γ is nondecreasing and submodular, then for any Nash equilibrium S ∈ S we
have
γ¯(S) ≥
1
1 + c
γ¯(Ω). (5)
When the social utility function γ is nondecreasing and submodular, we have c ∈
[0, 1], which implies that γ¯(S) ≥ γ¯(Ω)/2.
4. Nash Equilibria Based on User Groups
4.1. Social-Aware Nash Equilibria
In this section, we first introduce the social group utility maximization system and the
social-aware Nash equilibrium defined in Chen, Gong, Yang, & Zhang (2014). Then,
we show that the results of Vetta (2002) are directly applicable to bounding the per-
formance of any social-aware Nash equilibrium.
In Chen, Gong, Yang, & Zhang (2014), each user belongs to a group and aims to
maximize its social group utility instead of its private utility. Each group is formed
based on social ties between users and may reflect friendship, kinship, college relation-
ship, etc. The social group utility for user i (a mapping from X to real numbers) is
defined as
ηi = αi +
∑
m∈N si
ωimαm
where αi’s are private utilities, N
s
i is the set of all users having a social tie with user i,
and wim’s are weight parameters that reflect the strengths of social ties between user
i and the users in N si , and wim ∈ [0, 1]. Correspondingly, the expected group utility η¯i
for user i, mapping from sequences in S to real numbers, is the expected value of ηi.
Definition 4.1. Chen, Gong, Yang, & Zhang (2014) A strategy sequence S =
(s1, . . . , sN ) ∈ S is a social-aware Nash equilibrium if no user can improve its group
utility by unilaterally changing its strategy, i.e., for any group i,
η¯i(S) ≥ η¯i((S−i, s
′
i)), ∀s
′
i ∈ Si. (6)
By comparing the definition of a Nash equilibrium and a social-aware Nash equi-
librium, we see that the only difference between them is that one is defined based on
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expected private utility functions and the other based on expected group utility func-
tions. But because in Chen, Gong, Yang, & Zhang (2014), each user has its own group
utility function, and therefore its own expected group utility function, then the results
of Vetta (2002) (in particular Theorem 1 and Theorem 2) directly apply to bound
the performance of the social-aware Nash equilibrium of Chen, Gong, Yang, & Zhang
(2014). We prove in Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 that this is in fact the case, if the social
group utility system (γ, {ηi}
N
i=1) is valid. A social group utility system (γ, {ηi}
N
i=1) is
valid if it satisfies the following assumptions, which are counterparts of Assumption 1
and Assumption 2 with expected group utilities standing in for expected private util-
ities.
Assumption 3. The group utility of user i (1 ≤ i ≤ N) is at least as large as the loss
in the social utility resulting from user i dropping out of the game. That is, the system
(γ, {ηi}
N
i=1) has the property that for any strategy sequence S = (s1, . . . , sN ) ∈ S,
η¯i(S) ≥ γ¯si(S−i), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ N. (7)
Assumption 4. The sum of the group utilities of the system is not larger than the
social utility, i.e., for any strategy sequence S = (s1, . . . , sN ) ∈ S,
N∑
i=1
η¯i(S) ≤ γ¯(S). (8)
Given X ∈ X , if for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N , the inequalities ηi(X) ≥ γxi(X−i) and∑N
i=1 ηi(X) ≤ γ(X) hold, then the inequalities (7) and (8) hold.
Remark 1. Comparing Definitions 3.1 and 4.1, we have that the only difference
between a Nash equilibrium and a social-aware Nash equilibrium is that the former
is defined in terms of α¯i, and the latter is defined in terms of η¯i. So if we take η¯i to
play the role of α¯i, then satisfying Assumptions 3 and 4 means that the utility system
satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2. Based on the results of Theorems 3.2 and 3.3, we have
the following Theorems 4.2 and 4.3.
Theorem 4.2. For a valid utility system (γ, {ηi}
N
i=1), if the social utility function γ
is submodular, then for any social-aware Nash equilibrium S ∈ S we have
γ¯(S) ≥
1
2
(
γ¯(Ω) +
N∑
i=1
γ¯si(S−i ∪ Ω)
)
. (9)
Theorem 4.3. For a valid utility system (γ, {ηi}
N
i=1), if the social utility function γ
is nondecreasing and submodular, then for any Nash equilibrium S ∈ S we have
γ¯(S) ≥
1
1 + c
γ¯(Ω). (10)
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4.2. Group Nash Equilibria
In this section we consider a different type of social group utility maximization system
in which the set of all users are divided into disjoint groups, and the users in the same
group choose their strategies by maximizing their group utility function jointly.
Assume that the set of users N = {1, . . . , N} is divided into l disjoint groups, in
which group i (1 ≤ i ≤ l) has users {mi + 1, . . . ,mi + ki}, where mi =
∑i−1
j=1 kj, kj is
the number of users in group j, and
∑l
j=1 kj = N . Let s
i = (smi+1, . . . , smi+ki), where
si ∈ Si is the strategy for user i. We call s
i the group strategy for group i. It includes
the strategies taken by all the users in group i (1 ≤ i ≤ l). We use S−i to denote
the sequence of group strategies taken by all groups except for group i. Given S−i,
we denote by (S−i, ti) the group strategy sequence obtained when group i changes its
group strategy from si to ti. Similarly, for X ∈ X , we use xi and X−i to denote the
sequence of actions taken by the users in group i, and the sequence of actions taken
by all groups except for group i, respectively. For convenience, we still use ηi and η¯i to
denote the group utility function and the expected group utility function for group i.
We define a group Nash equilibrium as follows.
Definition 4.4. A strategy set S = (s1, . . . , sN ) is a group Nash equilibrium of a
utility system if no group can improve its group utility by unilaterally changing its
group strategy, i.e., for any 1 ≤ i ≤ l,
η¯i(S) ≥ η¯i((S
−i, ti)), ∀ti = (tmi+1, . . . , tmi+ki),
where tj ∈ Sj for mi + 1 ≤ j ≤ mi + ki.
We say that the utility system (γ, {ηi}
l
i=1) is valid if it satisfies the following two
assumptions.
Assumption 5. The group utility of group i is at least as large as the loss in the social
utility resulting from all the users in group i dropping out of the game. That is, the
system (γ, {ηi}
l
i=1) has the property that for any strategy sequence S = (s
1, . . . , sl) ∈
S,
η¯i(S) ≥ γ¯si(S
−i), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ l. (11)
Assumption 6. The sum of the group utilities of the system is not larger than the
social utility, i.e., for any strategy sequence S = (s1, . . . , sl) ∈ S,
l∑
i=1
η¯i(S) ≤ γ¯(S). (12)
Given X ∈ X , if for any 1 ≤ i ≤ l, the inequalities ηi(X) ≥ γxi(X
−i) and∑l
i=1 ηi(X) ≤ γ(X) hold, then the inequalities (11) and (12) hold. We now present our
results on the performance of a group Nash equilibrium relative to the optimal social
strategy Ω. Although the overall flow of the proof for deriving performance bound
(without curvature) for the group Nash equilibria is similar to that of the proof from
Vetta (2002), we still include it here because it will help us derive performance bounds
involving curvature later on.
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Lemma 4.5. Assume that the social utility function γ is a submodular set function.
Then for any strategy set S ∈ S,
γ¯(Ω) ≤ γ¯(S) +
∑
i:σi⊆Ω\S
γ¯σi(S
−i)−
∑
i:si⊆S\Ω
γ¯si(S
(i−1) ∪ Ω), (13)
where S(i) = s1⊕ s2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ si is the sequence of the group strategies taken by the first
i groups.
Proof. Write Ω = σ1⊕· · ·⊕σl and S = s1⊕· · ·⊕ sl, where σi = (σmi+1, . . . , σmi+ki),
si = (smi+1, . . . , smi+ki), and σj , sj ∈ Sj for mi + 1 ≤ j ≤ mi + ki.
By Propositions 1 and 2 in Liu, Chong, & Pezeshki (2016), we have that
γ¯(Ω ∪ S) ≤ γ¯(S) +
∑
i:σi⊆Ω\S
γ¯σi(S)
≤ γ¯(S) +
∑
i:σi⊆Ω\S
γ¯σi(S
−i)
and
γ¯(Ω ∪ S) = γ¯(Ω) +
∑
i:si⊆S\Ω
γ¯si(S
(i−1) ∪ Ω).
Combining the two inequalities above, we have (13).
Theorem 4.6. For a valid utility system (γ, {ηi}
N
i=1), if the social utility function γ
is submodular, then any group Nash equilibrium S = (s1, . . . , sN ) ∈ S satisfies
γ¯(S) ≥
1
2
(
γ¯(Ω) +
l∑
i=1
γ¯si(Ω ∪ S
−i)
)
. (14)
Proof. By Lemma 4.5, we have
γ¯(Ω) ≤ γ¯(S) +
∑
i:σi⊆Ω\S
γ¯σi(S
−i)−
∑
i:si⊆S\Ω
γ¯si(S
(i−1) ∪ Ω).
By the definition of a group Nash equilibrium, we have
∑
i:σi⊆Ω\S
γ¯σi(S
−i) ≤
∑
i:σi⊆Ω\S
γ¯si(S
−i) ≤
∑
i:si⊆S\Ω
γ¯si(S
−i).
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By Assumptions 5 and 6, we have
∑
i:si⊆S\Ω
γ¯si(S
−i) ≤
∑
i:si⊆S\Ω
η¯i(S)
≤ γ¯(S)−
∑
i:si⊆S∩Ω
η¯i(S)
≤ γ¯(S)−
∑
i:si⊆S∩Ω
γ¯si(S
−i).
Combining the inequalities above and using submodularity results in
γ¯(Ω) ≤ 2γ¯(S)−
∑
i:si⊆S∩Ω
γ¯si(S
−i)−
∑
i:si⊆S\Ω
γ¯si(Ω ∪ S
(i−1))
≤ 2γ¯(S)−
∑
i:si⊆S∩Ω
γ¯si(Ω ∪ S
−i)−
∑
i:si⊆S\Ω
γ¯si(Ω ∪ S
−i)
≤ 2γ¯(S)−
l∑
i=1
γ¯si(Ω ∪ S
−i),
which implies that the inequality (14) holds.
Remark 2. If the utility function γ is nondecreasing, then the term
∑l
i=1 γ¯si(Ω∪S
−i)
is non-negative, so γ¯(S) ≥ 12 γ¯(Ω), which means that the social value of any group Nash
equilibrium is at least half of the optimal social utility value.
To better characterize the relation of the social utility value of any group Nash
equilibrium and that of the optimal solution Ω, we define the group curvature cki of
the social utility function for group i as
cki = max
S∈S,γ¯si(∅)6=0
{
1−
γ¯si(Ω ∪ S
−i)
γ¯si(∅)
}
.
Lemma 4.7. Assume tha the utility function γ is submodular and nondecreasing.
Then we have cki ≤ c for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. Especially, if X1 = X2 = · · · = XN , then we have
cki ≤ ckj for ki ≥ kj .
The proof of cki ≤ c is similar to that of Theorem 3.3 from Liu, Chong, & Pezeshki
(2017) and the proof of cki ≤ ckj for ki ≥ kj is similar to that of Theorem 3.4 from
Liu, Chong, & Pezeshki (2017), so we skip it here.
Lemma 4.8. Assume that γ is a submodular set function. Then for any strategy set
S = (s1, . . . , sN ) ∈ S, we have
γ¯(S) ≤
l∑
i=1
γ¯si(∅)
where si = (smi+1, . . . , smi+ki) for 1 ≤ i ≤ l.
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Proof. By the submodularity of γ¯, we have
γ¯(S) = γ¯s1(∅) + γ¯s2(s
1) + · · ·+ γ¯si(s
1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ si−1)
+ · · ·+ γ¯sl(s
1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ sl−1)
≤ γ¯s1(∅) + γ¯s2(∅) + · · ·+ γ¯si(∅) + · · ·+ γ¯sl(∅)
=
l∑
i=1
γ¯si(∅).
Theorem 4.9. For a valid utility system (γ, {ηi}
l
i=1), if the social utility function γ is
nondecreasing and submodular, then any group Nash equilibrium S = (s1, . . . , sN ) ∈ S
satisfies
γ¯(S) ≥
1
1 + max
1≤i≤l
cki
γ¯(Ω).
Especially, if X1 = X2 = · · · = XN , we have
γ¯(S) ≥
1
1 + ck∗
γ¯(Ω),
where k∗ = min1≤i≤l ki.
Proof. For any group Nash equilibrium S ∈ S, write S = s1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ sl, where si =
(smi+1, . . . , smi+ki) for 1 ≤ i ≤ l.
By the definition of the curvature cki for group i, we have
γ¯si(Ω ∪ S
−i) ≥ (1− cki) γ¯si(∅).
Using the inequality above, Lemma 4.8, and Theorem 4.6, we have
γ¯(S) ≥
1
2
(
γ¯(Ω) +
l∑
i=1
γ¯si(Ω ∪ S
−i)
)
≥
1
2
(
γ¯(Ω) +
l∑
i=1
(1− cki) γ¯si(∅)
)
≥
1
2
(
γ¯(Ω) + (1− max
1≤i≤l
cki)
l∑
i=1
γ¯si(∅)
)
≥
1
2
(γ¯(Ω) + (1− max
1≤i≤l
cki)),
which implies that
γ¯(S) ≥
1
1 + max
1≤i≤l
cki
γ¯(Ω).
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When X1 = X2 = · · · = XN , by Lemma 4.7, we have that cki ≤ ckj for ki ≥ kj.
Therefore, we have
γ¯(S) ≥
1
1 + ck∗
γ¯(Ω),
where k∗ = min1≤i≤l ki.
Remark 3. When the group utility function γ is non-decreasing and submodular, it
is easy to check that cki ∈ [0, 1], which implies that 1/(1 + max1≤i≤l cki) ≥ 1/2.
Remark 4. When the group utility function γ is non-decreasing and submodular, we
have γ¯(S) ≥ γ¯(Ω)/(1+max1≤i≤l cki) ≥ γ¯(Ω)/(1+c). This shows that the bound for the
case with grouping is tighter than that for the case without grouping. Of course, this
is unsurprising, because grouping entails cooperation. Moreover, under the condition
that each user has the same action space, the larger the value of ki, the higher the
degree of cooperation, and the tighter the lower bound.
Remark 5. We point out that each group can be viewed as a new user with vector-
valued actions, and a 1/2 bound for the performance of group Nash equilibrium follows
from the result of Vetta. But our analysis goes further by defining the group curvature
cki associated with group i with ki users; in doing so, we obtain a tighter bound,
namely 1/(1 + max1≤i≤l cki). In the special case where each user has the same action
space, then we have that any group Nash equilibrium achieves at least 1/(1 + ck∗) of
the optimal social utility, where k∗ is the least number of users among the l groups,
and the larger the value of k∗, the tighter the lower bound.
5. Example
In this section, we consider the application of utility-based maximization in database
assisted spectrum access, adopted from Chen, Gong, Yang, & Zhang (2014). We will
show that the utility system is valid and the social utility function is submodular.
We then apply the performance bounds for Nash, social-aware Nash, and group Nash
equilibria.
Consider a set of users N = {1, . . . , N} and a set of TV channels M = {1, . . . ,M}.
The users in N wish to access the TV channels in M, for purposes other than TV
transmissions, in a way that does not unnecessarily disrupt the primary use of these
channels, which is for TV transmission. Specifically, to protect the primary TV users,
each user i sends a spectrum access request message containing its geo-location in-
formation to a geo-location database. In response, the database sends back the set of
vacant channels Mi ∈ M and the allowable transmission power level Pi. Then each
user i chooses a feasible channel ai from the vacant channel set Mi for data trans-
mission. When multiple users choose to access the same vacant channel, they might
interfere with each other, depending on their relative distance: If the distance between
users m and i is dmi, interference occurs only if dmi ≤ δ, where δ is a given threshold.
The aim is to minimize the total interference which is the sum of interference received
by each user.
For a collection of selected channels A = (a1, . . . , aN ) ∈
∏N
i=1Mi, the interference
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experienced by user i is defined as
Ii(A) =
∑
m∈N pi
Pmd
−λ
mi I{ai=am} + ω
i
ai
,
where N pi is the set of users that can interfere with user i, λ is a path-loss factor, I{·}
is the indicator function, and ωiai is the noise including the interchannel interference in
channel ai resulting from primary TV users using other channels. The private utility
function αi of user i is then defined as
αi(A) = −Ii(A) = −
∑
m∈N pi
Pmd
−λ
mi I{ai=am} − ω
i
ai
.
This private utility reflects the fact that each user desires to minimize its experienced
interference. The social group utility of each user i is defined as
ηi(A) = αi(A) +
∑
m∈N si
wimαm(A).
Finally, the social utility function is γ(A) =
∑N
i=1 αi(A).
5.1. Nash Equilibria
First we will prove that the utility system (γ, {αi}
N
i=1) satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2,
and the social utility function γ(A) =
∑N
i=1 αi(A) is submodular.
To prove that the system (γ, {αi}
N
i=1) satisfies Assumption 1, it suffices to prove
that for 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
αi(A) ≥ γ(A) − γ(A−i).
By the definition of αi(A), we have that
γ(A) = −
N∑
i=1
∑
m∈N pi
Pmd
−λ
mi I{ai=am} −
N∑
i=1
ωiai .
Thus,
γ(A)− γ(A−i) = −
∑
m∈N pi
Pmd
−λ
mi I{ai=am} −
∑
n:i∈N pn
Pid
−λ
in I{an=ai} − ω
i
ai
= αi(A)−
∑
n:i∈N pn
Pid
−λ
in I{an=ai}
≤ αi(A),
which shows that the utility system (γ, {αi}
N
i=1) satisfies Assumption 1. Because
γ(A) =
∑N
i=1 αi(A), the utility system (γ, {αi}
N
i=1) also satisfies Assumption 2.
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Let Ak = (a1, . . . , ak) and Al = Ak ⊕ (ak+1, . . . , al) (l < N). To prove that γ(A) =∑N
i=1 αi(A) is submodular, it suffices to prove that for any aj ∈Mj (l + 1 ≤ j ≤ N),
γaj (Ak) ≥ γaj (Al).
By definition, we have
γaj (Ak) = γ(Ak ⊕ aj)− γ(Ak)
= −
∑
m∈N pj ,1≤m≤k
Pmd
−λ
mjI{aj=am} −
∑
n:j∈N pn ,1≤n≤k
Pjd
−λ
jn I{an=aj} − ω
j
aj
and
γaj (Al) = γ(Al ⊕ aj)− γ(Al)
= −
∑
m∈N pj ,1≤m≤l
Pmd
−λ
mjI{aj=am} −
∑
n:j∈N pn ,1≤n≤l
Pjd
−λ
jn I{an=aj} − ω
j
aj ,
which implies that
γaj (Ak) ≥ γaj (Al).
We have now established that the utility system (γ, {αi}
N
i=1) is valid, and the social
utility function γ(A) =
∑N
i=1 αi(A) is submodular. This implies that the performance
bound in Theorem 3.2 holds.
5.2. Social-Aware Nash Equilibria
Let
p = min
1≤j≤N
{1 +
∑
i:j∈N si
wij}
Because maximizing
∑N
i=1 αi(A) (with respect to A ∈ M) is equivalent to maximiz-
ing p
∑N
i=1 αi(A), for convenience, we set γ(A) = p
∑N
i=1 αi(A) when considering the
utility system (γ, {ηi}
N
i=1).
Now prove that the system satisfies Assumption 4.
N∑
i=1
ηi(A) =
N∑
i=1
αi(A) +
N∑
i=1
∑
n:n∈N si
ωinαn(A)
=
N∑
j=1
(1 +
∑
i:j∈N si
wij)αj(A)
≤ p
N∑
i=1
αi(A).
This implies that the utility system (γ, {ηi}Ni=1) satisfies Assumption 4.
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We now prove that the utility system (γ, {ηi}
N
i=1) satisfies Assumption 3. By the
definition of γ(A) and ηi(A), we have
γ(A)− γ(A−i) = p

− ∑
m∈N pi
Pmd
−λ
mi I{ai=am} −
∑
n:i∈N pn
Pid
−λ
in I{an=ai} − ω
i
ai


= p

αi(A)− ∑
n:i∈N pn
Pid
−λ
in I{an=ai}


= αi(A) + min
1≤j≤N
{
∑
i:j∈N si
wij}αi(A) − p
∑
n:i∈N pn
Pid
−λ
in I{an=ai}.
and
ηi(A) = αi(A) +
∑
n:n∈N si
winαn(A).
For convenience, we consider the case when the transmission power of all the users
are the same (i.e., Pm = Pn = P for any users m and n). By Theorem 1 from
Chen, Gong, Yang, & Zhang (2014), we have that the social tie between any two users
is symmetric (i.e., wnm = wmn). Then we can write p and p(γ(A)−γ(A−i)) as follows.
p = min
1≤i≤N
{1 +
∑
m∈N si
wim}
and
p(γ(A) − γ(A−i)) = p(αi(A) −
∑
m∈N pi
Pd−λmi I{ai=am})
= αi(A) + ( min
1≤i≤N
∑
m∈N si
wim)αi(A) + (−p
∑
m∈N pi
Pd−λmi I{ai=am}).
So only if
∑
n:n∈N si
winαn(A) ≥ ( min
1≤i≤N
∑
m∈N si
wim)αi(A)− p
∑
m∈N pi
Pd−λmi I{ai=am} (15)
holds, we have that Assumption 3 holds.
Finally, we have that γ(A) = p
∑N
i=1 αi(A) is submodular because we proved that∑N
i=1 αi(A) is submodular in Subsection A. So we have now established that if the
inequality (15) holds, then the utility system (γ, {ηi}
N
i=1) is valid and the social utility
function γ(A) = p
∑N
i=1 αi(A) is submodular. This implies that the performance bound
for a social-aware Nash equilibrium in Theorem 4.2 holds.
5.3. Group Nash Equilibria
We now partition the set of users N = {1, . . . , N} into l disjoint groups and write, as
before,
∑l
i=1 ki = N and mi =
∑i−1
j=1 kj . Group i comprises the users {mi+1, . . . ,mi+
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ki}, and the group utility function is ηi(A) =
∑ki
j=1 αmi+j(A). Finally, the social utility
is given by γ(A) =
∑N
i=1 αi(A).
We now show that the utility system (γ, {ηi}
N
i=1) satisfies Assumption 5. Let A =
a1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ al ∈ M. Then for 1 ≤ i ≤ l,
γ(A)− γ(A−i) = −
mi+ki∑
j=mi+1
∑
n∈N pj
Pnd
−λ
nj I{aj=an}
−
mi+ki∑
j=mi+1
∑
n:j∈N pn
Pjd
−λ
jn I{an=aj} −
mi+ki∑
j=mi+1
ωjaj
= ηi(A)−
mi+ki∑
j=mi+1
∑
n:j∈N pn
Pjd
−λ
jn I{an=aj}
≤ ηi(A),
which implies that the utility system (γ, {ηi}
N
i=1) satisfies Assumption 5.
Because
∑l
i=1 ηi(A) =
∑N
i=1 αi(A) = γ(A), we have that the utility system
(γ, {ηi}
N
i=1) also satisfies Assumption 6. Moreover, we have proved that the social
utility γ(A) =
∑N
i=1 αi(A) is submodular in Subsection A.
We have thus established that the utility system (γ, {ηi}
N
i=1) is valid and the social
utility function γ(A) =
∑N
i=1 αi(A) is submodular. This shows that the performance
bound for a group Nash equilibrium in Theorem 4.6 holds.
Remark 6. The performance bounds we derive here for Nash equilibria, social-
aware Nash equilibria, and group Nash equilibria are worst-case performance
bounds. The fact that the social-aware group Nash equilibrium derived by
Chen, Gong, Yang, & Zhang (2014) achieves 85% of the optimal social utility is con-
sistent with our bound.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we considered variations of the non-cooperative utility system con-
sidered by Vetta, in which users are grouped together. We considered two types
of grouping among users in utility systems. The first type of grouping is from
Chen, Gong, Yang, & Zhang (2014), where each user belongs to a group of users hav-
ing social ties with it. For this type of utility system, each user takes its strategy by
maximizing its social group utility function, giving rise to the notion of social-aware
Nash equilibrium. We proved that this social utility system yields to the bounding
results of Vetta for non-cooperative system, thus establishing provable performance
guarantees for the social-aware Nash equilibria. For the second type of grouping we
considered, the set of users is partitioned into l disjoint groups, where the users within
a group takes their group strategy by maximizing their group utility, giving rise to
the notion of the group Nash equilibrium. In this case, each group can be viewed as
a new user with vector-valued actions, and a 1/2 bound for the performance of group
Nash equilibria follows from the result of Vetta (2002). By defining the group cur-
vature cki associated with group i with ki users, we showed that if the social utility
function is nondecreasing and submodular, then any group Nash equilibrium achieves
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at least 1/(1 + max1≤i≤l cki) of the optimal social utility. Especially, if each user has
the same action space, then we showed that any group Nash equilibrium achieves at
least 1/(1 + ck∗) of the optimal social utility, where k
∗ is the least number of users
among the l groups. Finally, we presented an example of a utility system for database
assisted spectrum access to illustrate our results.
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